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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

CINDY WILLIAMS,

: Appellate Court No. 20070286

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction based upon a plea of guilty by the
Defendant to the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance within 1000
feet of a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor and False Personal
Information to a Police Officer, a class C misdemeanor. The plea of guilty was
taken before the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin on the 19th day of March 2007.
Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HER GUILTY
PLEA?
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for
appeal by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw her plea. (R. 029).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v.
Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993). The Court applies "the clearly erroneous
standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that
decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). "However, the
ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional
and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999)
(See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 58-37-8(2) Prohibited Acts
(a) It is unlawful:
2

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice,
or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building,
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly
and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances
in any of those locations; or
for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.

Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i)
marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount
is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled
substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce
but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2)
subsequent to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection
(2).
Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled
substances as listed in:
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(i)

(f)

(g)

(h)

Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently;
and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months
to run consecutively and not concurrently.
Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i)
on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i)
violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having
in his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a
negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or the death of another,
A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body:
(i)
a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those
described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance
classified under Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree
felony; or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

Section 76-8-507 False Personal Information to Peace Officer.
(1)

A person commits a class C misdemeanor if, with intent of misleading a

peace officer as to the person's identity, birth date, or place of residence, the
4

person knowingly gives a false name, birth date, or address to a peace officer in
the lawful discharge of the peace officer's official duties.
(2)

A person commits a class A misdemeanor if, with the intent of leading a

peace officer to believe that the person is another actual person, he gives the
name, birth date, or address of another person to a peace officer acting in the
lawful discharge of the peace officer's official duties.

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 11(e)
e)

The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1)

If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;

(2)

the plea is voluntarily made;

(3)

the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront
and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by
entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those

(4)
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(B)

elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution
has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
conviction;

(5)

the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum
sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences;

(6)

if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;

(7)

the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea; and

(8)

the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.

These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the
record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to
the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was originally charged in an information filed October 25,
2006, with the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance within 1000 feet

6

of a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8(2)
and False Personal Infomiation to a Police Officer a class C misdemeanor in
violation of U.C.A. §76-8-507 (R. 01-2). On November 16, 2006, the Defendant
made an appearance before the Honorable Judge Parley R. Baldwin and entered
a plea of guilty to the charges (R. 57/2-5). In exchange for the guilty plea, the
State agreed to remain silent at sentencing. (R. 57/2)
Prior to sentencing the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty
plea. (R. 029). The basis for the request was because the police report was full
of lies and she believed that Adult Parole and Probation ("AP&P") was part of
the State and shouldn't be allowed to make a recommendation where the State
had agreed to remain silent. (R. 029).
On March 15, 2007, the Defendant appeared for sentencing. The Court
denied her motion to withdraw the guilty plea and sentenced her to one year and
ninety days in jail to be run concurrent with each other.

(R. 56/3).

The

Defendant filed a notice of appeal on March 30, 2007. (R. 048)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was originally charged in an information filed October 25,
2006, with the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance within 1000 feet
of a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8(2),
and False Personal Information to a Police Officer, a class C misdemeanor in
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violation of U.C.A. §76-8-507 (R. 01-2). Defense counsel worked out a plea
negotiation wherein the "State" would remain silent at sentencing. (R. 056/2)
The Defendant thereafter requested the court to allow her to withdraw her guilty
plea on the basis that she did not believe that AP&P should be allowed to make
a recommendation when the "State" had agreed to remain silent.

The

Defendant apparently understood the word "State" to include all employees of
the executive branch of the State of Utah including the prosecution as well as the
police. The Defendant therefore claims her plea was not voluntarily or
knowingly made.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Defendant knew, understood, and
comprehended her rights when she entered her guilty plea. At the time that the
Defendant entered her plea, she was under the impression that the state would
remain silent at sentencing, and that the term "state" included all governmental
entities, including the police. Although the trial court went through a complete
Rule 11 colloquy, the Court failed to mention that the Judge is not bound by
sentence recommendation and the term "State" only referred to the State
Prosecutor. Because of this, the Defendant at that time could not understand the
full terms of the plea negation. Only after reading through the pre-sentence
report did the Defendant feel her guilty plea was entered into unknowingly and
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mistakenly. The court did not inquire into the Defendant's ability to know and
understand the Rule 11 recitation of right, and therefore the court failed to meet
the requirement that the court insure that the Defendant knew and understood
these rights. The court's subsequent denial of the Defendant's motion to
withdraw her plea was therefore an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HER GUILTY
PLEA

The Court in the case of State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802? 805 (Utah 1993)
held that the appellate court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." The Court has
further noted that it applies "the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's
findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983
P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial
court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry
of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v.
Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911
P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)
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The trial court, therefore, must ensure that the Defendant's plea has
strictly met all the requirements of Rule 11, as well as meeting all constitutional
requirements. Any failure in the process requires the granting of a subsequent
motion by the Defendant to withdraw her plea.

A trial court abuses its

discretion by failing to grant the motion to withdraw the plea when a Rule 11
violation is present. In State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, ^f 23 this Court held:
We hold the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying Mora's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court that accepted the
plea failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 when it accepted
Mora's guilty plea without correctly incorporating the affidavit
into the record or establishing elsewhere on the record that Mora
knew the State was required to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The issue before the Court is whether the Defendant knowingly and
voluntarily entered her plea. Rule 11 requires that the defendant enter that plea
voluntarily and that the defendant know and understand each of the rights listed
in Rule 11(e). Although the trial court made the finding that the Defendant
voluntarily entered into the guilty plea, the court failed to explain to the
Defendant that the term "state" did not include all executive branch agencies.
The proper reviewing factors, pursuant to case law cited above, is whether
the trial court "strictly complied with Rule 11." This strict compliance would
include making a determination as to whether or not the Defendant knew and
understood all of the rights described to her in the plea colloquy.
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For a plea to be voluntarily and knowingly made, a "defendant must
understand the nature and value of any promise made to him." State v.
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 1988). If a defendant pleads guilty based
on "an exaggerated belief in the benefits of his plea ... he should be allowed to
withdraw his plea." State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, 1f 10, 57 P.3d 238
(quoting Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1275). Pleas based on illusory or misleading
promises generally will not be considered voluntary. See Copeland, 765 P.2d at
1275.
The Defendant, in the present case, did not fully understand the value (or
lack thereof) of the plea agreement until she had read the pre-sentence report.
The Defendant had an exaggerated belief in the benefits of her plea bargain.
Those benefits were that the state would remain silent at sentencing. The
Defendant was unaware that the "state" referred only to the State Prosecutor,
and mistakenly believed that the "state" referred to all state agencies. Because
Defendant's guilty plea was based on an exaggerated belief in the benefits of her
plea she should be allowed to withdraw her plea.
In the present case, the Defendant was under the impression that the term
"state" referred to all state employees. It is clearly understandable for an
individual to mistake the term "state" as including all executive agencies,
including State Prosecutors, Adult Probation and Parole and the Police
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Department. Failure to inform the Defendant of this substantial fact led to a
misunderstanding of the plea agreement and thus to an involuntary plea.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that, "when a plea rests in
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
The Defendant is cognizant of this Court's holding in State v. Thurston,
781 P.2d 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). While the holding may appear on its face
to be controlling in this case, Defendant would assert that the issue in this case is
a different issue altogether. In Thurston, the prosecutor agreed to recommend
probation rather than incarceration.
sentence report.

AP&P was directed to prepare a pre-

The pre-sentence report included the investigating police

officer's recommendation that the defendant should be sent to the Utah State
Prison and the statement that "15 years is not long enough." Id. at 1298.
This Court held that a prosecutor's agreement does not bind all state
agencies. "We also find that sound public policy requires a plea agreement
reached by a prosecutor not to be binding on other state agencies. The entire
sentencing process is a search for truth and an evaluation of alternatives." Id. at
1300.
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The issue in this particular appeal is not whether the State breached its
agreement when AP&P made sentencing recommendations to the trial court.
The issue is whether Defendant's plea was voluntarily made when she believed
that the agreement bound all state agencies from making recommendations
including AP&P.
The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of several important
constitutional

rights, including the privilege

against

compulsory

self-

incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses.
Because the entry of such a plea constitutes such a waiver, and because the
prosecution will generally be unable to show that it will suffer any significant
prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty
plea should, in general, be liberally granted. State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040
(Utah 1987)
In the case at bar, the Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw her
plea. The Defendant unknowingly entered into the terms of the plea negotiation
the day the plea was entered. The Defendant did not understand what was meant
by the state remaining silent. As soon as the Defendant became aware that the
term "state" only included the State Prosecutor, the Defendant filed a motion to
withdraw her plea of guilty. Because the prosecution would not suffer any
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significant prejudice by the withdrawal of the Defendant's guilty plea, this court
should allow the Defendant to withdraw her plea.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant did not understand what it meant for the State to remain
silent at sentencing.

Based on this misunderstanding, Defendant had an

exaggerated belief in the plea bargain and the plea was not voluntarily entered.
Based on this, the Defendant respectfully requests this court reverse the trial
court's denial of her motion to withdraw her plea, and remand for further
proceedings.
DATED this Ijo day of NovembeT2007

DEE W. S M i p i
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Weber County Attorney's Office, 2380 Washington Boulevard, Second Floor,
Ogden, Utah 84401, postage prepaid this lL> day of November 2007.

DEE W. SMI
Attorney at Law
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 061904033 MO

CINDY WILLIAMS,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

PARLEY R BALDWIN
March 15, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s) : MICHAEL BOUWHUIS, PDA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 5, 1957
Video
Tape Number:
PRB031507

MAR 1 9 200?

Tape Count: 10:36-10:39

CHARGES
1. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/16/2006 Guilty
2. FALSE PERSONAL INFORMATION TO PO - Class C Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/16/2006 Guilty
HEARING
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in custody
and is represented by Michael Bouwhuis, public defender. Court
denies the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. Court proceeds
with sentencing.

061904033

Page 1

CD19521167
WILLIAMS, CINDY

Case No: 061904033
Date:
Mar 15, 2007
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 3 65 day(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSE PERSONAL INFORMATION
TO PO a Class C Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 90 day(s)
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
The Court gives credit from today's date and allows the jail time
to run concurrent with each other.
Date d this /Q

day of

- m O A ^

~k BALDWIN
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 6F" WEBER COUNTY
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STATE OF UTAH,
5
Plaintiff,
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT

6
7

vs

CASE NO. 061904033

CINDY WILLIAMS,
8
Defendant
9
*****

10
11

SENTENCING

12

MARCH 15, 2 007

13

JUDGE PARLEY R. BALDWIN

14
*****

15
16
17

APPEARANCES:

18

FOR THE STATE:

MR. MARK R. DECARIA
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FOR THE DEFENDANT:

MR. MICHAEL BOUWHUIS

20
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ORIGINAL

25

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056

056

2

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE CLERK:
061904033.

State of Utah versus Cindy Williams,

This is time set for sentencing on page 1.

MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

Cindy.

Ms. Williams is present.

time set for sentencing.

This is the

The Court has also received a

motion to withdraw the plea of guilty.

I have had a chance

to review that.
Mr. Bouwhuis?
MR. BOUWHUIS:

I would submit it based on the motion

that was filed.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

The motion is denied.

The

Court has had a chance to review, and I'm denying the motion
to withdraw.
Mr. DeCaria, do you want to be heard on the senrencing?
MR. DECARIA:
Honor.

Let me just look here.

No, Your

We agreed to remain silent on sentencing.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Bouwhuis?
MR. BOUWHUIS:
with her.

Your Honor, I reviewed the report

She indicates that she —

Lake County Jail for that —

she is obviously in Salt

her case there has got her going

to the drug court, but this case would stand in the way of
doing that.

She has a drug problem.

We would like to get

that treatment through the drug court, and so she would like

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056
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to be able to do that.
She indicates to me, and 1 -- I looked in the report
here, and under the section that normally lists her custody
status and time served, they -- I'm not sure what this is.
This talks about some other issues but doesn't indicate how
much time she spent.

She tells me she spent 10 weeks in jail

on this particular charge.
And so what she's asking the Court to consider doing is
giving -- giving her credit for the time that she's done.
She would like to be then released to go do the drug court in
Salt Lake City, and of course on probation impose any other
conditions the Court feels would be appropriate in her case.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Bouwhuis.

I've had a

chance to review this and the letters, and I'm not willing to
do that.
Ms. William, it's the sentence of the Court that you
spend one year in jail on count one of the information, 90
days on count two.

Those times may run concurrent.

You'll

be given credit for the time that you've been in the Weber
County Jail.

That concludes this case.

(End of proceedings.)

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
801.395.1056
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER )
I, DIANE W. FLANAGAN, RPR, Official Court Reporter
in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
foregoing is a true and correct transcription from the
videotape recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled
matter.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or
employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a
relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or
financially interested directly or indirectly in this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
seal of office at Ogden, Utah, this 4th day of April, 2007.

,^Q*M A ^ w o CO • ~J-c tu^r*-^,
Diane W. Flanagan
U
Official Court Reporter
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